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THE PROBLEMS OF YESTERYEAR-COMMERCE AND DUE
PROCESS
ROBERT L. STERN*
Less than fifteen years ago, there were constitutional problems important
enough to stir the country, to threaten the sanctity of the Supreme Court.
These were the culmination of at least three decades of judicial controversy,
in which the pressure of events brought criticism of the Court's decisions,
both in noteworthy dissenting opinions and outside, to a new height. Fifteen
years later, there still are difficult and important constitutional problems, and
there still is criticism of the Supreme Court's decisions-though on a rela-
tively minor scale. But the issues which rocked more than the legal world
in the 1930's and in the period preceding have disappeared. A glance back-
wards to see what happened to them may help give perspective to the
significance of the problems of the current day.
The crucial issue prior to 1937 was whether the Constitution prohibited
government-state and Federal-from interfering with the free play of
economic forces (outside of the field of public utilities)-no matter how
great the public need. Federal legislation dealing with other phases of na-
tional or interstate industry than transportation was on important occasions
found to invade the powers reserved to the states.1 State laws were fre-
quently found invalid because they impinged on the field of interstate com-
merce committed by the Constitution to the Federal Congress.2 And the due
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were held to bar
both state and federal governments from regulating such economic factors
as prices, wages, and labor relations in businesses "not affected with a
public interest."
'3
*Office of the Solicitor General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C.;
author, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE (1950) (with Eugene Gressman), That Commeree
which Concerns More States than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 335 (1934) ; The Commerce
Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645 & 883 (1946), and
other articles.
1. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160 (1936)
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477 (1936) ; Railroad
Retirement Board v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 55 Sup. Ct. 758, 79 L. Ed. 1468 (1935);
Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 Sup. Ct. 651, 79 L. Ed. 1570 (1935);
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 570, 66 L. Ed.
975 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101
(1918) ; Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 19 Sup. Ct. 40, 43 L. Ed. 290 (1898);
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 15 Sup. Ct. 249, 39 L. Ed. 325 (1895).
2. E.g., DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 47 Sup. Ct. 267, 71 L. Ed. 524
(1927) ; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128 (1890). The cases
up to 1932 are collected in GAVIT, TIE COAMERCE CLAUSE 551-56, Appendix E (1932).
3. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 56 Sup. Ct. 918, 80 L. Ed.
1347 (1936) ; New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76 L. Ed.
747 (1932); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115, 73 L. Ed.
287 (1929); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. Ed. 913 (1928) ;
Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed. 718 (1927) ; Adkins
v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785 (1923) ; Charles Wolff
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There were, of course, cases which ran counter to these general trends 4
and which seemed to offer hope that the Court would relax its restrictions.
But as late as 1936 the Court was still holding that labor relations in the
coal industry only affected interstate commerce "indirectly," and therefore
were not subject to the power of Congress,5 that the amount of cotton
produced in the United States was only of local concern and therefore not
subject to federal control;' and that the fixing of minimum wages for
women violated the due process clause.7 These decisions, and the doctrines
for which they stand, now seem antediluvian. Although they hardly can be
said to be of great antiquity, they have a much less modern ring and
infinitely less authority than Gibbons v. Ogden,8 decided in 1824.
As all who remember the spring of 1937 in the Supreme Court will
recall, the great reversal in constitutional adjudication took place prior to
any change in the personnel of the Court-shortly after President Roosevelt
announced his plan to add six new Justices to the Supreme Court. This is not
the occasion to explore the details of that fascinating period, a story which
has often been told elsewhere.9 Suffice it to say that as new Justices began
ascending the bench during the following terms, the principles of the 1937
decisions came to be firmly entrenched. The four original dissenters-
Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, Butler, and McReynolds-were quickly
reduced to the latter two by voluntary retirement, and then to none. And
although the new Court in turn has divided into groups sometimes labeled-
accurately or inaccurately-as "conservative" and "liberal," there has seldom
been any difference of opinion as to any of the old fighting issues. For a time,
cases requiring interpretation of the doctrines finally accepted in 1937 con-
tinued to reach the Court. These cases enabled the Court to flesh out the
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed.
1103 (1923) ; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 61 L. Ed. 1336 (1917) ;
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441 (1915) ; Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436 (1908) ; Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905).
4. Commerce cases: Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 54 Sup. Ct. 396, 78
L. Ed. 804 (1934) ; Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 45 Sup.
Ct. 551, 69 L. Ed. 963 (1925); Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 43 Sup.
Ct. 470, 67 L. Ed. 839 (1923); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397, 66
L. Ed. 735 (1922); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 502, 55
L. Ed. 619 (1911); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276, 49
L. Ed. 518 (1905). Due process cases: Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 Sup.
Ct. 92, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934); O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S.
251, 51 Sup. Ct. 130, 75 L. Ed. 324 (1931) ; Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood
of Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 50 Sup. Ct. 427, 74 L. Ed. 1034 (1930).
5. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160 (1936).
6. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477 (1936).
7. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 56 Sup. Ct. 918, 80 L. Ed.
1347 (1936).
8. 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
9. E.g., JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPRE-MACY (1941); Stern, The




content of the newly accepted-if not newly invented'--doctrines. But in
recent years fewer and fewer such cases have been heard by the Court, both
because most lawyers have probably realized the futility of waging the
useless battle any longer, and because, except in very unusual situations,
the Court refuses to hear most such cases when attorneys do attempt to
bring them up. Only cases on the periphery of the "new" doctrines are now
likely to arouse the interest of the Court.
A brief discussion of the principles which the Court now applies, and of
the cases since 1937, will indicate both the extent to which the subjects are
no longer regarded as controversial and the locality of the present borderline
of uncertainty.
I. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
In a series of decisions prior to 1930, the Supreme Court had held that
the "liberty" guaranteed by the due process clause included liberty to con-
tract, and that except in "business affected with a public interest," govern-
mental interference with such essential economic relationships as prices and
wages was an infringement of that liberty." Since the validity of many
restrictions upon the freedom of business men was sustained,12 the only
general rule which could be drawn from the decisions was that types of
regulation of which the Court sufficiently disapproved were unconstitutional.
Although the Nebbia case in 1934,13 in which Mr. Justice Roberts joined
Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo in sustain-
ing a New York statute fixing minimum prices for milk, seemed to presage
a departure from this rule, Morehead v. Tipaldo,14 in 1936, saw Mr. Justice
Roberts joining the conservative Justices to nullify the New York minimum
wage law, on the disputable ground that overruling of Adkins v. Children's
Hospital1 5 had not been specifically requested. In 1937, however, he rejoined
the liberal Justices to overrule the Adkins case and uphold the validity of the
Washington minimum wage legislation in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.'0
On the same day and two weeks later the provisions of the Railway Labor
Act and the National Labor Relations Act, requiring employers to bargain
exclusively with the representatives chosen by a majority of the employees,
were held not to violate the due process clauseT-decisions clearly incon-
10. Some of the "new" doctrines can be traced back to John Marshall. See p. 462 infra.
11. See cases cited in note 3 supra.
12. E.g., the antitrust laws, zoning laws, banking and insurance laws, laws relating
to conservation, workmen's compensation, health and safety, laws designed to protect
the public against deception and fraud.
13. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934).
14. 298 U.S. 587, 56 Sup. Ct. 918, 80 L. Ed. 1347 (1936).
15. 261 U.S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785 (1923).
16. 300 U.S. 379, 57 Sup. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703 (1937).
17. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 57 Sup. Ct. 592,
81 L. Ed. 789 (1937) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937).
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sistent with Adair v. United States 8 and Coppage v. Kansas 9 decided in
1908 and 1915.
The 1937 decisions declared that regulatory legislation would not be
found to violate the due process clause merely because it restricted economic
liberty. Only restrictions which were in fact arbitrary, or not reasonably
related to a proper legislative purpose, it was suggested, would be held un-
constitutional in the future. Subsequently, in the Carolene Products case, the
Court, through Mr. Justice Stone, stated:
"[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed,
for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon
some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators ...
"[B]y their very nature such inquiries, where the 'legislative judgment is drawn
in question, must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either known or
which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it. ..."
Since it is difficult to conceive of any statute for which some rational basis
may not be found, this test means that the due process barrier to substantive
legislation as to economic matters has been in effect removed-although it
still stands in theory against completely arbitrary legislative action.
As might be expected, under this doctrine no statutes have been held
violative of the due process clause on grounds of substantive irrationality
since 1937. In 1939 and 1940, the Court sustained federal statutes fixing
prices of milk and coal, 21 in 1941 the minimum wage provisions of the
Fair Labor Standards Act,2 2 and in 1944 the general price and rent provisions
of the Emergency Price Control Act. 23 Olsen v. Nebraska, 4 which upheld
a state law regulating the fees fixed by employment agencies, explicitly
repudiated "the philosophy and approach of the majority" of the Court in
the pre-Nebbia price fixing cases. And Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Iron
Co.,25 in sustaining state laws prohibiting the closed shop, made it clear that
this principle would be applied to laws restricting the freedom to contract
of employees as well as employers. In other cases, the Court has disposed
summarily of the contention that statutes were in violation of the due process
18. 236 U.S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed. 441 (1915).
19. 208 U.S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed. 436 (1908).
20. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 154, 58 Sup. Ct. 778,
82 L. Ed. 1234 (1938).
21. United States v. Rock Royal Co-Op., 307 U.S. 533, 59 Sup. Ct. 993, 83 L. Ed.
1446 (1939) ; Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60 Sup. Ct. 907, 84
L. Ed. 1263 (1940).
22. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941).
23. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 Sup. Ct. 660, 88 L. Ed. 834 (1944):
Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 64 Sup. Ct. 641, 88 L. Ed. 892 (1944).
24. 313 U.S. 236, 61 Sup. Ct. 862, 85 L. Ed. 1305 (1941).
25. 335 U.S. 525, 69 Sup. Ct. 251, 93 L. Ed. 212 (1949).
1951]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
clause because they interfered with economic freedom or were otherwise
unreasonable.
20
Although there is no longer doubt as to how the Court will decide cases
of this sort, it cannot be said that the Court has limited the due process
clause to procedural matters and repudiated the concept of due process as a
bar to sufficiently arbitrary or irrational substantive legislation-although Mr.
Justice Black's opinion in the Lincoln Union case looks strongly in that
direction. The Court has certainly not so stated in express terms, and the
opinions still continue to examine legislation under attack to see whether it
has a rational basis or is "substantially related to a legitimate end sought to
be attained. '27 But, as the Court recently declared, "a pronounced shift of
emphasis ... has deprived the words 'unreasonable' and 'arbitrary' of the
content" which they formerly held.2 8 The self-abnegation with which the
Court now applies the rationality test may, as a practical matter, make it
unnecessary for the Court to decide whether it must reconsider the basic
doctrine.
Recent decisions have given the due process clause broad scope in pro-
tecting against state action the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment
and also other "fundamental" rights contained in the first eight amendments. 29
Certainly the rights to freedom of speech, press, and religion are not
"procedural" in the ordinary sense. The due process clause would thus seem
still to be interpreted as embodying a restriction which is substantive rather
than procedural-but in an orbit entirely different from that of the older
cases. Significantly, in the field of civil liberties, the test is not whether
there is a rational basis for legislation. Instead, since the due process clause
is held to embody the content of the First Amendment, the legislation may
be required to sustain the heavier burden imposed upon laws restricting
First Amendment freedoms.3 0 These problems are beyond the scope of this
26. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186, 71 Sup.
Ct. 215 (1950) ; Railway Express Agency v. United States, 336 U.S. 106, 109, 69 Sup.
Ct. 463, 93 L. Ed. 533 (1949) ; Sage Stores v. Kansas, 323 U.S. 32, 36, 65 Sup. Ct. 9,
89 L. Ed. 25 (1944) ; Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 18, 29, 65 Sup.
Ct. 1, 89 L. Ed. 15 (1944); Railroad Commission v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311
U.S. 570, 61 Sup. Ct. 343, 85 L. Ed. 358 (1941); Railroad Commission v. Rowan &
Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 60 Sup. Ct. 613, 84 L. Ed. 1368 (1940), as am ended, 311
U.S. 614, 61 Sup. Ct. 66, 85 L. Ed. 390 (1940) ; Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning
Co., 309 U.S. 310, 318, 60 Sup. Ct. 517, 84 L. Ed. 774 (1940).
27. E.g., Cities Service Oil Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186,
71 Sup. Ct. 215 (1950).
28. Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220, 225, 69 Sup. Ct. 550,
93 L. Ed. 632 (1949).
29. For an apt exposition of this, see FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING TIE SUPREMi
COURT c.1 (1949).
30. See Nietmotko v. 'Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 71 Sup. Ct. 325 (1951); Kunz v.
New York, 340 U.S. 290, 71 Sup. Ct. 312 (1951) ; Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315,
71 Sup. Ct. 303 (1951) ; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 Sup. Ct. 448, 93 L. Ed. 513
(1949) ; Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 Sup. Ct. 1148, 92 L. Ed. 1574 (1948), 2
VAND. L. REV. 113; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed.
430 (1945), in which the prior authorities are collected and discussed.
[ VOl,. 4
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paper. They are suggested here only because of their bearing upon the
presently unanswerable question as to the extent to which the due process
clauses have been deprived of force as restrictions upon substantive law.
II. STATE POWER TO REGULATE INTERSTATE COMMERCO
31
Since Gibbons v. Ogden,32 and Cooley v. Board of Wardes,33 it has been
established that under the commerce clause some subjects of regulation are
within the exclusive power of Congress, and that even in the absence of
a showing of congressional intention some types of state laws are invalid.
This has not meant that the states were deprived by the commerce clause of
all power to enact measures affecting, or even directly regulating, interstate
commerce. But at some point, when the national, as compared to the local,
interest in the subject was sufficiently great, when the practical burden on
interstate commerce became sufficiently clear, the Court has always drawn
a line beyond which the states could not go.
The test applied in drawing this line has been expressed in various ways.
In the Cooley case, the first authoritative formulation of the accepted doctrine,
the Court declared:
"Now the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only
many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively
demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United
States in every port; and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively
demanding.that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation.
"Either absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature of this power requires ex-
clusive legislation by Congress, is to lose sight of the nature of the subjects of this
power, and to assert concerning all of them, what is really applicable but to a part.
Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one
uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as
to require exclusive legislation by Congress."'"
In some cases, this doctrine is regarded as "predicated upon the implica-
tions of the commerce clause itself," in others "upon the presumed intention
of Congress, where Congress has not spoken."33 Whatever the theory, the
result is the same.
In the years preceding 1937, the Court, without ever openly abandoning
the Cooley test, used many other expressions-such as whether the state
law was a "burden," or a "substantial" or "undue" burden, on commerce,
31. The related question of the commerce clause as a restriction upon state taxing
power is treated in the article by 1Mr. Barrett on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce,
p. 496 infra.
32. 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
33. 12 How. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (1852).
34. 12 How. at 319.
35. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768, 65 Sup. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed.




whether the effect on commerce was "direct" or "indirect," whether the
regulation was or was not imposed "on" interstate commerce itself. It
was difficult, if not impossible, to tell-at least with any certainty-whether
these expressions merely constituted different methods of stating the Cooley
doctrine, or whether the Court was applying different tests. The only gen-
eralization which could be drawn from the numerous decisions and expres-
sions was, approximately in the words of my mentor on this subject, 6 that the
states may regulate interstate commerce some, but not too much. Under this
not very definite test, a great many state laws were held invalid.87
The principle change since 1937 has not been in the formula but in its
application. For a number of years thereafter no nondiscriminatory8" state
regulations fell afoul of the commerce clause. Justice Black expressed the
view that the Cooley doctrine itself went too far in limiting state power; he
preferred the theory of Chief Justice Taney that only Congress, and not the
courts, could invalidate state legislation. 9 There was doubt as to whether the
Court would find any nondiscriminatory state law in conflict with the com-
merce clause itself.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,40 decided in 1945, and Morgan V.
Virginia,41 in 1946, not only resolved the doubt, but marked a definite re-
assertion of the principle of the Cooley case. In doing so, the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Stone and following the thoughts expressed in his
earlier opinions,42 made explicit the considerations which would guide it in
applying that principle. The test was a practical one, in which the actual
effect upon interstate or national interests was weighed against the local
or state interest involved. State laws limiting the number of cars on railroad
trains and requiring the segregation of passengers in interstate busses were
found to impinge upon commerce in fields in which national uniformity was
essential. In the one instance the make-up of trains, and in the other the
seating arrangement in busses was subject to disturbance at every state line
36. Professor Thomas Reed Powell of Harvard Law School.
37. See the compilation in Appendix E to GAVIT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 550-56
(1932). This tabulation shows that during the decade 1921-1930, 38 state laws (both
tax and regulatory) were found invalid under the commerce clause. Between 1941 and
1950 there were ten such decisions, of which five involved state taxes. Of the remaining
five cases, three were concerned with statutes which would be regarded as discriminating
against interstate commerce (see p. 455 infra). The remaining two cases are the Southcrn
Pacific and Morgan cases, discussed immediately below in the text.
38. As to laws discriminating against interstate commerce, see p. 455 et seq.
39. See opinions of Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona,
325 U.S. 761, 784, 65 Sup. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed. 1915 (1945) ; concurring in Morgan v.
Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386, 66 Sup. Ct. 1050, 90 L. Ed. 1317 (1946); dissenting in
Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 545, 553, 69 Sup. Ct. 657, 93 L. Ed. 865 (1949).
For Taney's views, see FR.ANKFURTER, THE COMmERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL,
TANEY AND WAME, c.2 (1937).
40. 325 U.S. 761, 65 Sup. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed. 1915 (1945).
41. 328 U.S. 373, 66 Sup. Ct. 1050, 90 L. Ed. 1317 (1946).
42. E.g., DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44, 47 Sup. Ct. 267, 71 L. Ed. 524
(1927) (dissent).
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if differing state regulations were permissible; On the other hand, state
laws having a lesser impact upon interstate transportation, such as a require-
ment that cabooses be placed at the end of freight trains, 43 were upheld. The
competing national interest has not been deemed sufficiently clear to prevent
the states from fixing prices for natural gas and milk sold within a state
for outside consumption, even though the direct effect was to raise prices for
extrastate consumers.44 Whether the decisions last cited would be applied to
commodities generally, which did not present the problems peculiar to
natural gas and milk, cannot be foretold.
The recent cases seem to integrate the "need for uniformity" principle
of the Cooley case and the "undue burden" formula appearing in later de-
cisions with the statements requiring the weighing of conflicting local and
national interests. In some sentences in the opinions, the first two concepts
are stated in the alternative. Thus, in the Southern Pacific case, the Court
declared that the states lack "authority to impede substantially the free flow
of commerce from state to state, or to regulate those phases of the national
commerce which, because of the need of national uniformity, demand that their
regulation, if any, be prescribed by a single authority.' 45 In the Morgan case,
these two ideas-if they are two-are interwoven in Mr. justice Reed's state-
ment that "state legislation is invalid if it unduly burdens that commerce in
matters where uniformity is necessary."46 In California v. Zook,47 the
balancing of state and national interests is treated as a more accurate state-
ment of the Cooley rule: "if a case falls within an area in commerce thought
to demand a uniform national rule, state action is struck down. If the activity
is one of predominantly local interest, state action is sustained. More
accurately, the question is whether the state interest is outweighed by a na-
tional interest in the unhampered operation of interstate commerce." 48 These
cases-and others4 0-recognize that the Court exercises a practical judgment
in balancing the national interest against the local interest in each case.
Most recently, in December 1950, a unanimous Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Clark in Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co.,5"
restated the governing principle as follows:
43. Terminal Railroad Ass'n v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 63
Sup. Ct. 420, 87 L. Ed. 571 (1943).
44. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 71 Sup. Ct. 215
(1950) ; Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg, 306 U.S. 346, 59 Sup. Ct. 528, 83 L. Ed. 752
(1939).
45. 325 U.S. at 767.
46. 328 U.S. at 377.
47. 336 U.S. 725, 69 Sup. Ct. 841, 93 L. Ed. 1005 (1949).
48. 336 U.S. at 728.
49. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 37-40, 68 Sup. Ct. 358, 92 L.
Ed. 455 (1948); Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 211, 64 Sup. Ct. 967,
88 L. Ed. 1227 (1944); Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co.; 314
U.S. 498, 506, 62 Sup. Ct. 384, 86 L. Ed. 371 (1942).
50. 340 U.S. 179, 71 Sup. Ct. 215 (1950).
1951 ]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
"It is now well settled that a state may regulate matters of local concern over which
federal authority has not been exercised, even though the regulation has some impact on
interstate commerce. . . .The only requirements consistently recognized have been
that the regulation not discriminate against or place an embargo on interstate com-
merce, that it safeguard an obvious state interest, and that the local interest at stake
outweigh whatever national interest there might be in the prevention of state restric-
tions."
It is likely-though not at all certain-that the Court will apply the
same test whether the direct impact of the state law burdening interstate
commerce is upon interstate or intrastate transactions. In Parker v. Bront,
5 2
the question presented-was whether California regulation of the intrastate
marketing of the bulk of the national crop of raisins before they were
processed for interstate sale and shipment was prohibited by the commerce
clause. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Stone, held that whether
the proper rule was the "mechanical test" applied in some earlier cases, under
which a state law was invalid if it regulated interstate-but not intrastate-
commerce, or the balance of interest rule based upon an "accommodation of the
competing demands of the state and national interest involved," the state
law was valid. But the reference to the first test as "mechanical" strongly sug-
gests that the Court thought such an approach an artificial one, which it would
not favor if forced to a choice. The Parker decision cannot properly be ap-
praised without reference to the fact that California's program had been
approved and financed by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to congres-
sional agricultural policy. The Court has subsequently cast some doubt as
to whether, apart from this factor, the decision would have been the same. 1
And indeed, it is certainly arguable that the national commercial interest
should prevent a state producing most of a commodity distributed throughout
the nation from limiting the quantity produced or marketed in order to
raise the price to consumers. 5 But, at least where the state is seeking to
conserve a limited national resource, the state's authority seems to be
definitely established.5 6
Both the Soutlern Pacific and the Morgan cases significantly rejected
the contention that a state may avoid the limitations of the general doctrine
of the Cooley case by "simply invoking the convenient apologetics of the
police power,"57 in the former as a means of preventing accidents, and in the
51. 340 U.S. at 186-87.
52. 317 U.S. 341, 63 Sup. Ct. 307, 87 L. Ed. 315 (1943).
53. 317 U.S. at 362.
54. Hood & Sons v. Duliond, 336 U.S. 525, 537, 69 Sup. Ct. 657, 93 L. Ed. 865
(1949), 3 VAND. L. Rav. 113.
55. See p. 455 infra.
56. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 71 Sup. Ct.
215 (1950); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 52 Sup.
Ct. 559, 76 L. Ed. 1062 (1932) ; see Note, 64 HARv. L. Rav. 642 (1951).
57. Southern Pacific case, 325 U.S. at 780; Morgan case, 328 U.S. at 380; quoting
from Mr. Justice Holmes in Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Kaw Valley Drainage Dist.,
233 U.S. 75, 79, 34 Sup. Ct. 564, 58 L. Ed. 857 (1914).
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latter to avert possible friction between races. Although a great many cases
have upheld state laws relating to safety, even as applied to interstate trans-
portation,"8 the Court pointed to other safety regulations held invalid when
the burden upon interstate commerce became unduly great.5 9 State regulation
of the weight and width of motor trucks on interstate highways, which con-
cededly "materially interfered with interstate commerce," 60 was differentiated
on the ground that the highways were built, maintained, and policed by the
states and were, therefore, of peculiar local concern, or, more accurately,
constituted a subject over which "the state has exceptional scope for the
exercise of its regulatory power." 61
The conclusion to be drawn froth these recent cases is that the Court
has returned to the historical Cooley doctrine, but has articulated more
candidly than in the older cases what it takes into consideration in applying
that principle. It is probably also true that, with respect to most subjects, a
heavier burden than formerly is placed upon the party seeking to establish
that the state legislation improperly burdens interstate commerce.
The discussion up to this point has assumed that the state legislation
involved does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Even Mr.
Justice Black seems to agree that a state law imposing greater burdens on
interstate commerce than on local commerce is repugnant to the commerce
clause. 2 State laws designed to keep a resource or to favor a business within
the state, to benefit that state at the expense of other states, have also con-
sistently been held invalid, at least when the injury to other states was
substantial., 3 A recent example is the South Carolina statute held invalid
in Toomer v. TVitsell, '4 which required vessels catching shrimp in South
Carolina waters to unload, pack and stamp their catch at a South Carolina
port before shipment to other states. A California law designed to exclude
indigent immigrants from other states would also seem to fall in the
same category.65 Such statutes can be regarded as discriminatory-though
58. See cases collected in Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 779, and in Morgan, 328
U.S. at 378-79.
59. Ibid.
60. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783, 65 Sup. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed.
1915 (1945).
61. Ibid. The leading cases distinguished were South Carolina Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 58 Sup. Ct. 510, 82 L. Ed. 734 (1938); and Maurer v.
Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 60 Sup. Ct. 726, 84 L. Ed. 969 (1940).
62. See his dissent in Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 549, 556, 69 Sup.
Ct. 657, 93 L. Ed. 865 (1949), in which he refers to Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454,
61 Sup. Ct. 334, 85 L. Ed. 275 (1940), an opinion in which he joined, and his earlier
dissent in Gwin, White & Price v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 446, 455, 59 Sup. Ct. 325, 83
L. Ed. 272 (1939). But cf. his dissents in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 407, 68 Sup.
Ct. 1157, 92 L. Ed. 1460 (1948); and Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 357,
71 Sup. Ct. 295 (1951).
63. See cases cited in Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 535-37, 69 Sup. Ct. 657,
93 L. Ed. 865 (1949).
64. 334 U.S. 385, 403, 68 Sup. Ct. 1157, 92 L. Ed. 1460 (1948).
65. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 Sup. Ct. 164, 86 L. Ed. 119 (1941).
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the results in the cases are also justifiable under the "uniformity" or "undue
burden" theories discussed above.
In Hood & Sons v. Du Mond,6 decided in 1949, the Court divided
sharply as to whether, in order to prevent depletion of the supply available
within the state, and to avoid destructive competition, New York could
refuse to permit a Massachusetts local distributor to open an additional
receiving plant from which milk could be taken from New York. The
majority treated the case as one in which a state was favoring home con-
sumers and competitors against those in other states, and thus condemned the
New York regulation as discriminating against, as well as burdening, inter-
state commerce. The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson declares that
the basic historical purpose of the commerce clause was to prevent each state
from seeking economic advantage at the expense of the other states. 67 The
four dissenting Justices asserted that the Court's decision was a departure
from the fundamental principle of the Cooley case. Mr. Justice Black thought
the decision a reinvigoration of the Court's former tendency improperly to
restrict the authority of the states to regulate business.08 Mr. Justice Frank-
furter believed that further inquiry into the facts was essential to determine
how the competing state and national interests should be balanced. 60
It is true that the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson, for the Court, does
no follow the Colley approach, or even cite any of the cases in which the
doctrine has been approved and applied. But since he himself, along with
most of the Justices who joined with him, had joined in the leading opinions
accepting the Cooley principle, it is doubtful if he, or they, regarded the
Hood decision as an abandonment of the basic doctrine. It seems much
more likely, in view of the language of the opinion and the facts of the case,
that the majority believed that the case came within the exceptional category
for discriminatory state regulations, and also that such an assertion of state
power, from its very nature, imposed a burden on interstate commerce which
was necessarily "undue," since it was precisely the type of regulation which
the framers meant most clearly to prohibit.70 Although the case may have
66. 336 U.S. 525, 69 Sup. Ct. 657, 93 L. Ed. $65 (1949), 3 VAND. L. REV. 113.
67. 336 U.S. at 532-39.
68. See id. at 562-64, particularly.
69. Id. at 576
70. "The material success that has come to inhabitants of the states which make
up this federal free trade unit has been the most impressive in the history of commerce,
but the established interdependence of the states only emphasizes the necessity of
protecting interstate movement of goods against local burdens and repressions. We need
only consider the consequences if each of the few states that produce copper, lead, high-
grade iron ore, timber, cotton, oil, or gas should decree that industries located in that
state shall have priority. What fantastic rivalries and dislocations and reprisals would
ensue if such practices were begunl Or suppose that the field of discrimination and
retaliation be industry. May Michigan provide that automobiles cannot be taken out of
that State until local dealerd demands are fully met? Would she not have every argument
in the favor of such a statute that can be offered in support of New York's limiting sales
of milk for out-of-state shipment to protect the economic interests of her competing
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been a close one on its facts, it seems clear that it was not meant to be
the forerunner of any new general doctrine. The subsequent Cities Serzice
case, decided in the following year by a unanimous Court, including, of course,
Mr. Justice Jackson, reaffirms the Cooley doctrine and states:
"The vice in the regulation invalidated by Hood was solely that it denied facilities
to a company in interstate cbmmerce on the articulated ground that such facilities
would divert milk supplies needed by local consumers; in other words, the regulation
discriminated against interstate coninerce.u
The most recent case on the subject is both interesting and significant.
Madison, Wisconsin, required all milk consumed within the city to be
pasteurized within five miles of the center of town. This excluded milk from
the Dean Milk Company's pasteurization plants in Illinois, 65 and 85 miles
away. Although the ordinance doubtless favored local business, its avowed and
undenied purpose was to facilitate inspection by the local health department;
it was certainly more convenient and economical for Madison not to send
its inspectors far afield. In Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 2 decided January 15,
1951, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Clark, held the ordinance to
be an unlawful discrimination against interstate commerce. The Court
assumed that, apart from the discrimination, the subject lay within the sphere
of state regulation, despite its effect upon interstate commerce. But it con-
cluded that, "an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against
competition from without the state" was not permissible "even in the
exercise of [a city's] unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of
its people, if reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve
legitimate local interests, are available.173 The Court then found that
"reasonable and adequate alternatives are available,"7 4 since Madison could
charge the cost of inspection of distant milk plants to the pasteurizer, or could
rely on inspection by local officials in other areas whose standards of inspec-
tion were so graded by the United State Public Health Service as to enable
Madison to determine whether its own standards were satisfied. Both Madison
and Wisconsin health officials had testified in the case that this system gave
consumers adequate protection. The Court concluded that to permit Madison
dealers and local consumers? Could Ohio then pounce upon the rubber-tire industry, on
which she has a substantial grip, or retaliate for Michigan's auto monopoly?
"Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every fanner and every
craftsman shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access
to every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his exports, and
no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them. Likewise, every
consumer may look to the free competition from every producing area in the Nation to
protect him from exploitation by any. Such was the vision of the Founders; such has
been the doctrine of this Court which has given it reality." 336 U.S. at 538-39.
71. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 188, 71 Sup.
Ct. 215 (1950) (italics supplied).
72. 340 U.S. 349, 71 Sup. Ct. 295 (1951).




to adopt a regulation of this sort when "not essential for the protection of
local health interests ... would invite a multiplication of preferential trade
areas destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause." 7
Mr. Justice Black, with Justices Douglas and Minton concurring, dis-
sented on the grounds that a good faith health regulation applicable both to
interstate and intrastate pasteurizers was not a discrimination against inter-
state commerce, and that in any event, the Court should not "strike down
local health regulations unless satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt" that the
available substitutes "would not lower health standards." 70
The Dean Milk decision, seemingly for the first time, applies to a local
law found to discriminate against interstate commerce the technique of
balancing the respective local and national interests employed in other cases
in which local regulations are said to burden commerce, though with a
reversed presumption. In the absence of discrimination, the Court tends
to sustain the state action unless interference with commerce is clear and
the local interest not very substantial; where there is discrimination, the
Dean case holds, it must appear that there is no other reasonable method of
safeguarding a legitimate local interest.7 7 Where a state law has no other
purpose than to favor local industry, this balancing of interest approach
probably will not be used, inasmuch as the purpose of the state regulation
would be illegitimate.
The early cases invalidating state laws requiring local inspection in
such a way as to exclude products from distant sources-Minnesota v.
Barber8 and Brimnner v. Rebman 0 -had adopted a less flexible approach.
But where no discriminatory purpose is apparent, and where both interstate
and intrastate imports from over five miles away are excluded, it is not
too clear whether the regulation can properly be said to "discriminate"
against interstate commerce. And even if such a regulation be properly
classified as discriminatory for commerce clause purposes, the local need
might be so overpowering as to completely outweigh, for the particular
situation, the national interest in a market not restricted by states lines.8"
It is thus reasonable in such cases to employ the same practical approach as
when a state law interferes with but does not technically discriminate against
interstate commerce. The justification for shifting the burden is that
75. Id. at 356.
76. Id. at 357, 359.
77. See Braden, Umpire to the Federal System, 10 U. OF CHi. L. RFv. 27, 30 (1942).
78. 136 U.S. 313, 10 Sup. Ct. 862, 34 L. Ed. 455 (1890).
79. 138 U.S. 78, 11 Sup. Ct. 213, 34 L. Ed. 862 (1891)
80. Thus, if pasteurized milk should become unsafe for human consumption in the
time necessary to transport it more than a specified distance, the local interest in
protecting the health of its people would seem to overbalance, even from the standpoint
of the nation as a whole, the advantages of interstate trade in milk from more distant
points.
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an actual prohibition of all interstate but not of all local trade is, on its
face, what the commerce clause was designed to prevent, and therefore
to be countenanced only when the local need in the particular case can
plainly be shown to be greater than the interest in nation-wide free trade
upon which the economy and welfare of this nation largely rest.
Basic to the Court's premise is the view, with which the minority seem
to disagree, that a local regulation which prohibited both interstate and
intrastate trade-shipments from pasteurization plants more than five miles
from the city-discriminated against interstate commerce. With respect
to this, the majority merely stated, "It is immaterial that Wisconsin milk
from outside the Madison area is subjected to the same proscription as
that moved in interstate commerce. Cf. Briomner v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78,
82-83 (1891)."81 Briinner v. Rebman does appear to be directly in point,
since the state law there involved prohibited the sale of all meat slaughtered
more than one hundred miles from the place of sale, unless locally inspected,
while not requiring the inspection of other meat. As a matter of semantics,
however, it cannot be said with certainty that a state regulation of this
sort is "discriminatory." It excludes some intrastate trade, along with the
interstate; on the other hand, it excludes all interstate. Nevertheless, the
purpose of the commerce clause would be effectively frustrated by a multi-
tude of municipal trade barriers of this sort, even though they discriminated
against some intrastate trade along with the interstate. Accordingly, it
seems reasonable for the Court to treat such regulations as discriminatory
-or at least to require their proponents to justify them by proof of actual
and serious local necessity, as distinct from local economic advantage and
convenience.
The principles and cases heretofore discussed have been concerned with
the effect of the commerce clause itself upon state laws, in the absence of any
federal regulation. Since the Constitution vests the power to regulate
interstate commerce in the Congress, there cannot be-or at least there
should not be 8s -- any doubt as to the overriding authority of Congress to
determine what the states may or may not regulate in the field subject to
congressional control. The Southern Pacific case states in express terms
that Congress "may either permit the states to regulate the commerce in a
manner which would otherwise not be permissible . . . or exclude state
81. 340 U.S. at 354 n.4.
82. Writers have found logical difficulty in reconciling the conception of the com-
merce clause as forbidding state action by its own force with the power of Congress
to consent to otherwise invalid state regulation. See Bikl6, The Silence of Congress,
41 HARv. L. REv. 200 (1927); Powell, The Validity of State Legislation Under the
Webb-Kenyon Law, 2 So. L.Q. 112 (1917); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State
Power-Revsed Version, 47 COL. L. Ray. 547, 552-60 (1947). But "The Supreme Court
has not been concerned in its opinions with the theoretical difficulties." RUTLEDGE, A
DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 64 n.26 (Univ. of Kan. Press, 1947).
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regulation even of matters of peculiarly local concern which nevertheless
affect interstate commerce" (citing cases).s3 In 1949, in California v. Zook,84
the Court reiterated that "despite theoretical inconsistency with the rationale
of the Commerce Clause as a limitation in its own right, the words of the
Clause-a grant of power [to Congress] -admit of no other result."85
These statements as to the supremacy of the congressional will when Congress
breaks its silence were amplified in the exhaustive opinion of Mr. Justice
Rutledge, speaking for a unanimous Court, in Prudential Insurance Co. v.
Benjamin,8s which sustained the authority of Congress to permit the states
to regulate interstate commerce in insurance.
This paper will not deal with the problem of supersedure or "occupancy
of the field"-that is, when state regulation is invalidated or superseded by
congressional action under the commerce clause (or any other clause).
Although this is often regarded as a constitutional question, since there
is no doubt as to the supremacy of federal legislation the issue in each
case relates to the intention of Congress, actual or presumed. The problem
is thus more akin to statutory construction than to the constitutional
matters considered in this symposium. In each case the question to be
determined is whether a state law is inconsistent with what Congress has
said, or with the accomplishment of the purpose of Congress, or with what
can be deduced as to what Congress intends when the federal statute is not
explicit. It seems sufficient here to cite the leading recent cases on the subject
for the reader who might wish to explore the matter further.
8 7
III. THE COMMERCE POWER OF CONGRESS
The burning issue of the 1930's was the extent of the regulatory power
of Congress under the commerce clause. Long prior to that time, in the
Shreveport Rate case s8 and many others, the Court had recognized that
under the commerce power, Congress could regulate intrastate transactions
which were sufficiently related to interstate commerce, which affected it
83. 325 U.S. at 769.
84. 336 U.S. 725, 69 Sup. Ct. 841, 93 L. Ed. 1005 (1949).
85. 336 U.S. at 728.
86. 328 U.S. 408, 66 Sup. Ct. 1142, 90 L. Ed. 1342 (1946).
87. International Union of Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U.S. 454, 70
SuD. Ct. 781. 94 L. Ed. 978 (1950); United Automobile Workers v. Wisconsin Rm-
ployment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245, 69 Sup. Ct. 516, 93 L. Ed. 651 (1949);
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 69 Sup. Ct. 841, 93 L. Ed. 1005 (1949); Bethlehem
Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Board, 330 U.S. 767, 67 Sup. Ct. 1026, 91 L. Ed.
1234 (1947) ; Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218, 67 Sup. Ct. 1146, 91 L. Ed.
1447 (1947) ; First Iowa Hydro-Electric Co-op v. Federal Power Commission, 328 U.S.
152, 66 Sup. Ct. 906, 90 L. Ed. 1143 (1946). See Note, "Occupation of the Field" in
Commerce Claue Cases, 1936-1946: Ten Years of Federalism, 60 HAr. L. RPv. 262
(1946). And see Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec., Ry., & M.C. Employees v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 340 U.S. 383, 71 Sup. Ct. 359, (1951).
88. Houston, E.&W.T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833, 58
L. Ed. 1341 (1914).
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"directly" but not "indirectly."' 9 But the development of this principle
was blocked by an opposing doctrine that certain activities, notably those
occurring in the process of producing commodities to be shipped in commerce,
were "local" by their very nature, and thus exclusively subject to state au-
thority under the Tenth Amendment.90 The Court reconciled this theory with
the "affecting commerce" doctrine by finding that no matter how close the
actual factual relationship, production affected commerce only "indirectly."
This line of decisions reached its climax, and conclusion, in the Carter Coal
case in 1936,91 which held that labor relations in the coal industry only had
an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, even though a coal strike might
halt not only all interstate shipments of coal but a large proportion of the
interstate movement of everything else as well.
The well-known story of how, in the following term, the Court abandoned
this approach and has since given full scope to the power of Congress to
regulate intrastate activities which in fact had a substantial relationship
to interstate commerce has been told elsewhere.92 There is no occasion
for repeating it here.
- The test presently applied has been stated in various ways. Wickard
v. Filburn9" declared that "even if appellee's activity be local and though it
may not be regarded as commerce, it may still whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at
some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.' "9 Mr. Justice
Jackson's opinion also quotes from the opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., that "the reach of that power extends
to those intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with or ob-
89. Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 54 Sup. Ct. 396, 78 L. Ed. 804 (1934) ;
Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295, 45 Sup. Ct. 551, 9 L. Ed.
963 (1925) ; Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 43 Sup. Ct. 470, 67 L. Ed.
839 (1923) ; Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 42 Sup. Ct. 397, 66 L. Ed. 735 (1922) ;
Railroad Comm'n of Wisconsin v . Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct.
232, 66 L. Ed. 373 (1922) ; United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 33 Sup. Ct. 141, 57
L. Ed. 333 (1913) ; Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 32 Sup. Ct. 2, 56 L. Ed.
72 (1911) ; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 25 Sup. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518
(1905).
90. See cases cited in note 1, supra; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S.
165, 52 Sup. Ct. 548, 76 L. Ed. 1038 (1932); Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 64, 45 Sup. Ct. 403, 69 L. Ed. 849 (1925); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262
U.S. 172, 43 Sup. Ct. 526, 67 L. Ed. 929 (1923) ; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260
U.S. 245, 43 Sup. Ct. 83, 67 L. Ed. 237 (1922) ; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1,'9 Sup. Ct.
6, 32 L. Ed. 346 (1888) ; Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 567, 14 L. Ed. 545 (1852). Although
many of these cases involve state legislation, they were treated as authoritative with
respect to the power of Congress during the period in question.
91. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855, 80 L. Ed. 1160 (1936).
92. See particularly, the discussion in Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229-35, 68 Sup. Ct. 996, 92 L. Ed. 1328 (1948); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119-25, 63 Sup. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942) ; Stern, The Com-
inerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HaRv. L. REV. 645, 883 (1946).
93. 317 U.S. 111, 63 Sup. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942).
94. 317 U.S. at 125 (italics supplied).
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struct the exercise of the granted power."' 5 The Mandeville Farms case refers
to "practical impeding effects" upon commerce, 96 and also declared that:
"The essence of the affectation doctrine was that the exact location of this
line made no difference, if the forbidden effects flowed across it to the
injury of interstate commerce or to the hindrance or defeat of congressional
policy regarding it."'
' 7
These statements still appear to treat the test as one of degree, which
does not substantially differ in terms from the former "direct-indirect"
formula, except that the standard of judgment is not the same and all non-
factual artificial restrictions upon application of the test have been removed.
But in these opinions, as well as others, the Court has not relied primarily
on these quantitative formulas but has gone back to basic constitutional prin-
ciples first enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall. In the Mandeville case, Mr.
Justice Rutledge pointed out that "the 'affectation' approach was actually a
revival of Marshall's 'necessary and proper' doctrine,"08 that is, of the neces-
sary and proper clause of the Constitution itself. The classical expression in
McCitloch v. iVlaryland,99 that "let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which. are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with
the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional," is plainly the
source of the statement by Mr. Justice Stone in the Darby'00 and Wrighiwood
Dairy cases,10 1 reiterated by Mr. Justice Jackson in Wickard v. Filburn,
10 2
that the commerce power "extends to those activities intrastate which so
affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over
it, as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to regulate
interstate commerce."
Other leading decisions have returned to the language of Chief Ju!,tice
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,10 3 and have emphasized the function of the
commerce clause as the practical instrument by which multi-state problems, not
susceptible of solution by any single state, were to be subjected to the
authority of the only governmental agency capable of dealing with them.
In the insurance case, United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters0 4 the
95. Id. at 125, quoting from United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S.
110, 119, 62 Sup. Ct. 523, 86 L. Ed. 726 (1942) (italics supplied).
96. 334 U.S. 219, 233, 68 Sup. Ct. 996, 92 L. Ed. 1328 (1948).
97. 334 U.S. at 232.
98. Id. at 232.
99. 4 Wheat. 316, 421, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819).
100. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121, 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941).
101. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, 315 U.S. 110, 119, 62 Sup. Ct. 523, 86
L. Ed. 126 (1942).
102. 317 U.S. 111, 124, 63 Sup. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942).
103. 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23 (1824).
104. 322 U.S. 533, 64 Sup. Ct. 1162, 88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944).
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Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black,10 5 declared, quoting from Gibbons
v. Ogden, that "Commerce is interstate, he said, when it 'concerns more
States than one.' . . .No decision of this Court has ever questioned this
as too comprehensive a description of the subject matter of the Commerce
Clause."' 0 0
In the case sustaining the validity of the so-called death sentence pro-
vision for public utility holding companies, North American Co. V. SEC,1°7
the Court reaffirmed this practical concept, saying-
"This broad commerce clause does not operate so as to render the nation power-
less to defend itself against economic forces that Congress decrees inimical or destruc-
tive of the national economy. Rather it is an affirmative power commensurate with
the national needs. . . . And in using this great power, Congress is not bound by
technical legal conceptions. Commerce itself is an intensely practical matter. Swift &
Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398. . . .To deal with it effectively, Congress
must be able to act in terms of economic and financial realities. The commerce clause
gives it authority so to act.... Once it is established that the evil concerns or affects
commerce in more states than one, Congress may act.... ."'
Since the North Anmerican opinion also states that the commerce "power
permits Congress to attack an evil directly at its source provided that the
evil bears a substantial relationship to interstate commerce,"'1 9 it is apparent
that the Court does not regard the general principle enunciated in that case
as inconsistent with the need for determining the question of degree re-
ferred to in some of the other recent cases-whether or not the relationship
of the intrastate transaction or regulation to interstate commerce is suffi-
ciently substantial. Indeed, no formulation of a test which requires the
exercise of judgment in drawing a line can avoid the necessity for determining
such questions of degree. But the cases since 1937 demonstrate not only
that the Court will examine the question before it pragmatically, but that it
will accord the greatest of weight to the congressional determination that
the relationship to interstate commerce is sufficiently close.
The relationship between the intrastate transaction and interstate com-
merce may take a number of forms. The simplest is actual interference with
the physical movement of goods interstate, such as may result from a strike
caused by an unfair labor practice or a boycott in violation of the Sherman
Act." 0 A physical effect may be that of floods in a nonnavigable tributary upon
105. Although this was a 4 to 3 decision, the dissents did not relate to the con-
stitutional issue, or to the constitutional principles set forth in the majority opinion. See
Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 64 Sup. Ct. 1196, 88 L. Ed. 1509 (1944).
106. 322 U.S. at 551.
107. 327 U.S. 686, 66 Sup. Ct. 784, 90 L. Ed. 945 (1946).
108. 327 U.S. at 705-06.
109. Id. at 705.
110. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 221-22, 59 Sup. Ct. 206, 83
L. Ed. 126 (1938); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct.
615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937); Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 54 Sup. Ct. 396,
78 L. Ed. 804 (1934).
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navigation, or other commercial activities, dow'nstream."' Where there
is a physical commingling of interstate and intrastate products and activities,
the whole may be regulated.11 2 And the same is true of economic com-
mingling in a market in which interstate and intrastate transactions are
inseparable.113 The effect may be upon interstate competition, by diverting
the interstate flow from one competitor to another as through unlawful
restraint in violation of the antitrust laws, 114 or substandard labor condi-
tions forbidden by the Fair Labor Standards Acts,."' or where an intrastate
price cutter could take business away from an interstate competitor whose
prices were fixed. 116 The relationship between the supply of a commodity
available for interstate shipment and the amount produced permits regu-
lation of the quantity manufactured or grown, as in the statutes fixing
agricultural quotas.111 Intrastate practices affecting interstate prices, such
as the cornering of a market or the control of the intrastate price for raw
materials or processes, are proper objects of federal regulation.,, Intrastate
acts which result in interstate shipments of noxious or unsafe articles,119
or of products which will cause economic or other injury in the state of
destination, may be controlled.120  The Public Utility Holding Company Act
is in part justified as a means of preventing evils which are spread and
perpetuated through the channels of interstate commerce.12 ' More generally,
intrastate transactions may be regulated when reasonably necessary to the
111. Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 61 Sup. Ct.
1050, 85 L. Ed. 1487 (1941).
112. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 59 Sup. Ct. 379, 83 L. Ed. 441 (1939) ; Mulford
v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38, 59 Sup. Ct. 648, 83 L. Ed. 1092 (1939).
113. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 62 Sup. Ct. 523, 86
L. Ed. 726 (1942) ; Houston, E. & W.T. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct.
833, 58 L. Ed. 1341 (1914).
114. Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 68 Sup. Ct.
822, 92 L. Ed. 1196 (1948); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68
Sup. Ct. 12, 92 L. Ed. 20 (1947) ; Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 54 Sup. Ct.
396, 78 L. Ed. 804 (1934).
115. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 122, 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941).
116. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co. 315 U.S. 110, 62 Sup. Ct. 523, 86 L.
Ed. 726 (1942).
117. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 Sup. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942).
118. United States v. Women's Sportswear Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 69 Sup. Ct. 714,
93 L. Ed. 805 (1949); Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 68 Sup. Ct. 996, 92 L. Ed. 1328 (1948); Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen,
262 U.S. 1, 43 Sup. Ct. 470, 67 L. Ed. 839 (1923); United States v. Patten, 226 U.S.
525, 33 Sup. Ct. 141, 57 L. Ed. 333 (1913).
119. E.g., Meat Inspection Act, 34 STAT. 1260 (1907), 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 71 et seq.
(1927).
120. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941);
Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 299 U.S. 334, 57 Sup. Ct. 277, 81
L. Ed. 270 (1937).
121. North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 66 Sup. Ct. 784, 90 L. Ed. 945
(1946); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 67 Sup. Ct. 133, 91
L. Ed. 103 (1946).
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control of interstate movements, 122 or to the effectuation of the purpose
for which such movements may be controlled.1
23
A brief reference to some of the recent decisions will show how these
principles have been applied.
The original Labor Board cases of 1937124 established the power of
Congress to regulate labor relations in factories which receive raw materials
and ship the goods they produce into other states. Subsequent cases held
the Act applicable to processors of products grown within the state but shipped
outside 25 and to a small manufacturer who delivered finished products
within the state to their owner for shipment . 2  The Sherman Act has also
been held to reach combinations of contractors in a single, city who raised
prices for manufacturing operations on goods assembled and shipped inter-
state by local jobbers. 27 It was in this case that Mr. Justice Jackson stated:
"If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how
local the operation which applies the squeeze." 28
The leading case under the Fair Labor Standards Act held it applicable
to a manufacturer of a raw material for sale in interstate commerce, both
on the ground that the regulation of wages at the factory helped keep goods
made under substandard conditions out of commerce and because such condi-
tions in themselves affect interstate competition.129  The statute was subse-
quently held to extend to employees in a building tenanted principally by
corporations producing for interstate commerce, 130 to watchmen and window
cleaners in factories producing for commerce even when employed by an
independent contractor,' 3 ' to a contractor who drilled oil wells for others
with knowledge that any oil produced would move interstate, 32 to employees
of a small newspaper with a regular circulation of 45 copies, or one half
of one per cent, outside the state.'
33
122. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941).
123. United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 68 Sup. Ct. 331, 92 L. Ed. 297 (1948);
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 33 Sup. Ct. 431, 57 L. Ed. 754 (1913).
124. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed.
893 (1937); NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 Sup. Ct. 642, 81 L. Ed.
918 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 57 Sup. Ct.
642, 81 L. Ed. 921 (1937).
125. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453, 58 Sup. Ct. 656,
82 L. Ed. 954 (1938).
126. NLRB v. Fainblatt. 306 U.S. 601, 59 Sup. Ct. 668, 83 L. Ed. 1014 (1939).
127. United States v. Women's Sportswear Manufacturers Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460,
69 Sup. Ct. 714, 93 L. Ed. 805 (1949).
128. 336 U.S. at 464.
129. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941).
130. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 62 Sup. Ct 1116, 86 L. Ed. 1638
(1942).
131. Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173, 66 Sup. Ct. 379,
90 L. Ed. 603 (1946); Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U.S. 540, 64 Sup. Ct.
320, 88 L. Ed. 298 (1944).
132. Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hail, 317 U.S. 88, 63 Sup. Ct. 125, 87
L. Ed. 83 (1942).




Perhaps the most sweeping of all the cases holding activity in the field
of production subject to the commerce power is Wickard v. Filburn,',"
which sustained the allocation of wheat quotas even to farmers who con-
sumed their own crops in the form of food, livestock feed and seed. More
recently, the Sherman Act was held to reach a scheme by manufacturers
in a single state to fix the prices paid farmers in the same state for their beets,
on the ground that the prices so fixed would inevitably affect the interstate
price of refined sugar.1
3 5
All of these cases involved transactions occurring before commerce began.
The Court has also held that the federal power extends to intrastate acts
after commerce has ceased. When, in United States v. Sullivan,'" a retail
druggist was prosecuted for selling improperly labeled pills which, though
previously shipped in interstate commerce, had been purchased by him
within the state and held for nine months, the Court disposed of the commerce
question summarily by reference to the early case of McDermott v. Wis-
consin." 7 That case had barred Wisconsin from substituting for the federal
interstate label its own label for use by the retail store, on the ground
that the purpose of the regulation of interstate labeling would be frustrated
if the label were removed before the product reached the ultimate con-
sumer. The National Labor Relations Act has also been held to reach large
retail stores ;138 for reasons of policy the Board has refrained from bringing
cases against smaller retail outlets. 139 At the time this was written, the
Supreme Court has before it the application of the Taft-Hartley Act to
union restraints in local building operations where some of the building
materials have come from without the state. 40  The antitrust laws have
also been held to reach a scheme to fix retail prices when the means adopted
reach beyond state boundaries.'41
The courts have also recognized the inseparability of interstate industry
by sustaining regulatory provisions which in isolation seem to have little to
134. 317 U.S. 111, 63 Sup. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942).
135. Mandeville Island Farms Co. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 68
Sup. Ct. 996, 92 L. Ed. 1328 (1948).
136. 332 U.S. 689, 68 Sup. Ct. 331, 92 L. Ed. 297 (1948).
137. 228 U.S. 115, 33 Sup. Ct. 431, 57 L. Ed. 754 (1913).
138. Loveman, Joseph & Loeb v. NLRB, 146 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1945) ; J.L.
Brandeis & Sons v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 751
(1944) ; NLRB v. M.E. Blatt Co., 143 F.2d 268 (3d Cir. 1943), ccrt. denied, 323 U.S.
774 (1944) ; NLRB v. J.L. Hudson Co., 135 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1943), cert. denicd, 320
U.S. 740 (1943) ; NLRB v. Kudile, 130 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S.
694 (1943) ; NLRB v. Suburban Lumber Co., 121 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 693 (1941).
139. See NLRB announcement, October 3, 1950, 19 U.S.L. WEEK 2147 (1950).
140. NLRB v. Local 74, 181 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. granted, 340 U.S. 902
(1950); International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir. 1950), cert. granted, 340 U.S. 902 (1950) ; NLRB v. Denver Building & Construc-
tion Trades Council, 186 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. granted, 340 U.S. 902 (1950).
All of these cases were argued on February 26 and 27, 1951.
141. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 65 Sup. Ct. 661, 89 L.
Ed. 951 (1945).
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do with interstate commerce. An extreme example is Egan v. United
States,142 which upheld the provision of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act prohibiting registered holding companies (by which is meant companies
engaged in interstate commerce, inter alia) from making contributions to per-
sons running for state or local political office. The court of appeals reasoned
that Congress could rationally conclude that such expenditures might affect
or burden interstate 'commerce through their impact upon rates, and might
also demonstrate a lack of economy in management and operation which
would be injurious to investors and consumers ;143 the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 44 The Court has also removed the pre-existing barrier-or
at least what many persons thought was a barrier-to the exercise of the
commerce power over the world of finance by holding that insurance com-
panies were engaged in interstate commerce.145
These cases, which indicate roughly the present scope of the power
of Congress under the commerce clause, justify two general observations.
Industry organized on a national scale, all the operations of which are in-
evitably economically interrelated, will not be compartmentalized into inter-
state and local segments, the former subject exclusively to federal control
and the latter exclusively to state regulation. The Court no longer construes
the Constitution as requiring a division for governmental purposes of what
is in fact inseparable. 4 6
The cases also demonstrate that it is unnecessary to judge merely the
effect on commerce of the individual transaction or person involved in the
particular case. The amount of wheat produced by a single farmer, or a single
sale of drugs by a retailer, obviously would not affect interstate commerce
substantially, or even noticeably. But Congress is entitled to take into ac-
count the total effect of many small transactions. "The total effect of the
competition of many small producers may be great."' 47 In Wickard v. Fil-
burn,4 8 the Court noted: "That appellee's own contribution to the demand
for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the
scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with
that of many others similarly situated, is fat from trivial."
142. 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943).
143. Id. at 374-75.
144. 320 U.S. 788 (1943).
145. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533, 64 Sup. Ct. 1162,
88 L. Ed. 1440 (1944); Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 64 Sup. Ct.
1196, 88 L. Ed. 1509 (1944).
146. See particularly, Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,
334 U.S. 219, 68 Sup. Ct. 996, 92 L. Ed. 1328 (1948); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 63 Sup. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942).
147. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123, 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941).
148. 317 U.S. 111, 127-28, 63 Sup. Ct. 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942). See also Polish
National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648, 64 Sup. Ct. 1196, 88 L. Ed. 1509 (1944) ;
North American Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 710, 66 Sup. Ct. 784, 90 L. Ed. 945 (1946).
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It may be true that the application of the principles now approved by
the Supreme Court may leave only minor aspects of our economy free from
the regulatory power of Congress. The reason for this, however, is not legal
but economic. If, in fact, the interstate and intrastate features of American
business are inseparable, it would be crippling to require an artificial separa-
tion for purposes of governmental control. This was the vice of the older,
now discarded, authorities.
The expansion of the power of Congress does not mean that there is
nothing left for the states to regulate. Congress need not exercise its au-
" thority over all aspects of our national economy, and, of course, it has not
done so. Some of its legislation is in aid of the authority of the states. It
is not at all unlikely-if a guess may be ventured-that the amount of state
commerce regulation has expanded along with the federal, rather than the
reverse. For along with the growth of federal power has come a greater
reluctance to find state legislation in conflict with the commerce clause. In
his lectures before the University of Kansas in 1947, Mr. Justice Rutledge
concluded:
"[J]ust as in recent years the permissible scope for congressional commerce action
has broadened, returning to Marshall's conception, the prohibitive effect of the clause
has been progressively narrowed. The trend has been toward sustaining state regula-
tion formerly regarded as inconsistent with Congress' unexercised power of commerce.
"Nevertheless, the general problem of adjustment remains. It has only been trans-
ferred to a level more tolerant of both state and federal legislative action. On this
level a new or renewed emphasis on facts and practical considerations has been al-
lowed to work. ..
"But the scope of judicial intervention has been narrowed by the more recent
trends, affecting both the affirmative and the prohibitive workings of the clause.
Greater leeway and deference are given for legislative judgments, national and state,
formally expiessed. Larger emphasis is put on scrutiny of particular facts and concrete
consequences, with an eye on their practical bearing for creating the evils the commerce
clause was designed to outlaw. Correspondingly, less stress ...is placed upon large
generalizations and dogmatisms inherited from levels of debate time has lowered. More
and more the controlling considerations of policy implicit in thinking, judgment, and
decision are brought into the open."1 '
These principles have also governed the application of the due process
clause to the regulation of economic relationships. It is because of the
greater leeway given legislative judgments that the commerce and due process
clauses have ceased to arouse as much controversy as formerly. There are,
of course, and presumably always will be, peripheral issues, some of un-
doubted importance, for the courts to decide. But, apart from these, in this
vital field of constitutional adjudication, there is seldom any longer much
doubt as to what the Court will do. As a consequence, many of the problems
of yesteryear are hardly problems today.
149. RuTLmG, A DECLARATION oF LEGAL FAiTH 68-70 (Univ. of Kan. Press, 1947).
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